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SOLIDARITY, THE REGIME AND THE PUBLIC 
By DAVID S. MASON* 
SINCE the imposition of martial law, Poland is a society that is sullen, pessimistic, rebelli- 
ous, and divided. It is sullen because of the regime's termination of the country's brief 
experiment in democracy and the first genuinely popular social movement in postwar 
history. The sullenness is intensified by a near-universal pessimism that sees little hope for 
a return to the heady days of Solidarity's existence. Although the independent union has 
now been banned, it continues to exist in a truncated underground form, and support for it 
is periodically manifested through popular demonstrations. 
Support for Solidarity is not, however, either universal or unconditional. The over- 
whelming support that Solidarity enjoyed in its first six months began to diminish some- 
what by the end of 1981. Some people viewed Solidarity, or its leaders, as being at least 
partially responsible for the political and economic crisis of 1981. Most of the population 
desired a return to economic and political stability. The regime, however, overestimated 
this dissatisfaction with Solidarity and miscalculated in its efforts to discredit that organiza- 
tion. Branding Solidarity and its leaders as counter-revolutionary, extremist and anti- 
socialist was counter to the experience and opinions of most of the members of that 
organization, and of the population. Most people opposed martial law and wanted Solidar- 
ity to be reactivated. While there are an abundance of public opinion surveys on these 
issues, the regime has apparently not relied much on these indicators, and instead has 
hoped to build support for the regime through improving food supplies, maintaining order, 
discrediting Solidarity and the past party leaders, and repressing all opposition. Given 
Poland's history of rebellion, and its 16-month experience with Solidarity, however, it 
seems unlikely that this method can long succeed. Solidarity filled a vital need in Polish 
society in expressing to the authorities the interests and requirements of the population. 
This need continues, even under the present regime. 
This paper examines the extent to which Solidarity acted as a link between the popula- 
tion and the regime and as a representative of the interests of the workers. It looks first at 
the reasons for the emergence of Solidarity, and Solidarity's subsequent embodiment of 
the society's desire for a political and economic order more in line with the ideals of 
socialism, and more genuinely representative of the workers' interests. It concludes by 
assessing the charges against Solidarity made by the martial law authorities, the extent of 
current support for the union and the regime, and the possibilities for a resolution of the 
stalemate. 
All of these issues are examined in this article with the use of survey research material 
that has issued from Poland between 1979 and 1982. This includes public opinion data 
collected by the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism (Instytut Podstawowych 
Problemow Marksizmu-Leninizmu-hereafter IPPML), which is attached to the Central 
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Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP); the Institute of Philosophy and 
Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences; the Public Opinion Research Centre 
(Osrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej-hereafter OBOP) of Polish Radio and Television; 
the Centre for Social Research (Osrodek Badafn Spolecznych-hereafter OBS) of Solidar- 
ity's Mazowsze region organization; and the Institute of Sociology of the University of 
Warsaw. The most interesting of these studies are the two national representative samples 
conducted by the Academy of Sciences at the end of 1980 and the end of 1981, entitled 
Polacy '80 (Poles '80) and Polacy '81. The first of these was published in a small edition in 
early 1981.1 The second was completed just before the introduction of martial law and has 
circulated only in manuscript form, though reports on the results were delivered in several 
seminars which the author attended at the Academy in the spring of 1982. 
The data in one or other of these surveys may be somewhat suspect, as are all public 
opinion surveys in communist countries.2 But there are two factors that may increase one's 
confidence in the results. First, the results for similar questions asked by different organ- 
izations (e.g. the regime's OBOP and Solidarity's OBS) are often remarkably similar, 
suggesting a minimal amount of institutional bias in the methodology and the conclusions. 
Second, the polls that were conducted between the autumn of 1980 and December 1981 
occurred in an unusually free and open atmosphere in Poland, no doubt contributing to the 
reliability of the results. 
The Emergence of Solidarity 
The turmoil of the summer of 1980 that led to the formation of Solidarity was to a large 
extent a result of frustrated expectations, blocked channels of communication, and an 
increasing sense of the lack of congruence between the ideals and reality of socialism.3 For 
five years after the December 1970 strikes and riots that brought down the Gomutka 
leadership, there was a feeling that conditions in Poland were improving, politically and 
economically. Wages, meat consumption, and the standard of living increased at record 
rates in the period 1970-75. Attitudes toward the political system also became more 
favourable. In a survey conducted by the Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism 
(IPPML) in 1975, 71-6% of the respondents felt that the influence of people on the 
policies of the country had increased since 1970.4 
During the latter half of the 1970s, however, the growth of the economy began to slow 
down and in 1979 actual decline began. The rapid improvements in the standard of living 
came to a halt, and popular expectation of Poland becoming a 'second Japan' were dashed. 
Expectations of a further opening up of the political system were also frustrated as the 
Gierek regime embarked on a recentralization of political and economic control. 
The sense of frustration was intensified by the increasing blockage of the channels of 
communication between the population and the elite. Virtually all of the traditional 
'transmission belts' between the two were discredited and distrusted by 1980. For the 
party, which was meant to be the main representative of the working class, support was 
weak even in the middle 1970s. In the 1975 IPPML study, for example, when asked if the 
activities of the party factory committees had improved since 1970, 81-3 % of the members 
of the factory committees thought so, but only 35 6% of the rest of the sample shared their 
opinion.5 What is remarkable here is not so much the low level of approval for the basic 
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organs of the party, but the large difference in perspective between party activists and their 
'constituents'. By 1975 there was already a serious lack of communication between the 
party and the population. By the end of 1980, after the formation of Solidarity, the party 
virtually collapsed. As thousands of members handed in their party cards, or just drifted 
away from the organization, total party membership declined for the first time since 1971 
and by the largest amount ever. In May 1981, when the official Centre for Public Opinion 
Research of Polish Radio and Television (OBOP) conducted a poll on trust in 15 institu- 
tions in Poland, the Polish United Workers' Party appeared in last place, with a positive 
rating by only 32% of the sample.6 This poll showed also that support for the party was 
particularly weak among young people. Further evidence of lack of support for the party 
was revealed in the November 1980 survey Polacy '80 in which only 32% of the sample 
favoured the idea of strengthening the role of the party in the administration of power.7 
Other institutions and channels of communication were similarly ineffectual. The local 
peoples' councils, billed as the basic and most representative agency of the government, 
had been reduced 'to agents for carrying out decisions of the higher tiers in the hierarchical 
administrative structure of the country',8 as a result of increasing centralist tendencies in 
the 1970s. One Polish sociologist asserted, in fact, that the peoples' councils 'never played 
any significant role in local politics' in Polish society.9 
The old trade unions had also become increasingly less important and less popular since 
1956. Even the official press admitted that the old unions were ignored by decision makers 
and that the authorities were 'changing the ideas of partnership into state paternalism'.10 In 
the OBOP May 1981 poll, only 21% expressed unqualified confidence in the branch 
unions, while another 35% qualified their approval."1 
The institution of workers' self-management had also become emasculated as a result of 
'the strategy of imposed industrialization' and the consequent centralization of planning 
and management of the economy.12 Blue-collar workers in particular were isolated from 
factory-level decision making as the 'engineering-technical cadres' increasingly came to 
dominate workers' self-government bodies, as well as party and other organs at the factory 
level. According to a 1979 survey of 164 workplaces, this skilled white-collar group was 
twice as likely to take an active part in these organizations as were workers.13 
As Polish sociologist Witold Morawski wrote, 'until 1980, all social and political 
organizations operating in individual enterprises-trade unions, party organizations, 
youth organizations and others-were only "transmission belts" from the authorities to 
society',14 but even this downward form of communication was hampered by the lack of 
participation and trust in these institutions. Some of these problems of blocked communi- 
cation channels could have been alleviated perhaps by the use of frequent and more 
penetrating public opinion surveys. Until the late 1970s there was a serious problem of 
conveying such data from the research centres to the authorities.15 An attempt was made to 
remedy this situation by arranging for the official OBOP and the newly created public 
opinion research centre attached to the Party's Central Committee (IPPML) to ask more 
interesting questions and to submit results and analyses of the data directly to the Central 
Committee and other executive bodies. But as a scholar who worked on those surveys 
complained, the results of the research conveyed to the party leadership were often 
ignored, even though they were 'a powerful signal of the growing difficulties'.16 
The strikes of the summer of 1980 and the formation of Solidarity were an attempt, born 
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of frustration, to create an institution genuinely representative of the interests of the 
workers. As Morawski puts it: 
The year 1980 was a turning point, in that for the first time in our postwar history there appeared 
the possibility for the institutionalization of a system for the articulation of interests and social 
values. The creation of independent trade unions and the right to strike are institutionalized 
guarantees that society has certain instruments of control over the centre of power.17 
Solidarity's Representativeness 
There is a strong democratic element in Poland's political culture. In polls on the 
characteristics of a good social system, Poles consistently list, in rough order: equality of 
opportunity, assurance of a proper standard of living for all, freedom of speech, and 
influence of citizens on the way society is governed. Freedom of speech is even more highly 
valued by workers than by intellectuals.l8 In the last few years, there has been a rapidly 
growing sense that the difference in 'participation in governing' is a major source of 
conflict and tension in society. Solidarity made a major contribution in filling this need for 
expression, influence and participation. 
Solidarity remained a highly popular institution during its entire existence, among both 
the population and its own members. In a poll on trust in various institutions (similar to the 
OBOP poll mentioned above) among 900 members of Solidarity in the Mazowsze region, 
Solidarity enjoyed the most trust (95%) of 15 institutions, ranking above the Catholic 
Church, the Army and Sejm. In another poll conducted in October 1981 by Solidarity's 
Mazowsze region Centre for Social Research (OBS) on the union's leadership, support 
was not quite so high. But when asked if in the preceding weeks Solidarity's national 
leadership had made any major mistakes, only 17% answered yes, with 51% responding 
no and 30% undecided. It is clear that support for the leadership of the union was less 
enthusiastic than for the union as a whole, but the results do not support the regime's claim 
that the leadership was too extreme. Among those who thought the leadership had made 
mistakes, for example, less than 10% thought it had been too hard-line or uncompromis- 
ing. Another 10% said strikes had been too frequent. Asked whether confidence in 
Solidarity's leadership had grown in recent weeks, 30% thought so, 33% thought there 
had been no change and 26% believed confidence had declined.19 Again, while support for 
the leadership was not unqualified, it certainly remained strong. 
The issue of radicalism was directly addressed in the OBS poll by asking members how 
they would assess the position of Solidarity during the latest negotiations with the govern- 
ment: 11% thought the union had been too hard-line and radical, while 52% believed the 
union's position was just right, and 16% thought the union had been too soft and ready to 
compromise. When asked how the union should behave in future negotiations, 36% 
thought it should be more hard-line, and only 17% favoured greater willingness to 
compromise. 
In another poll of some 700 Solidarity members in the east-central region, the respon- 
dents were asked in which of ten policy areas Solidarity should be involved, with either a 
decisive voice or an advisory one. This poll clearly shows the division in the union on the 
range of activities appropriate for Solidarity. There were only three areas for which a 
majority thought Solidarity should have a decisive role: improvement of living conditions 
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of working people (84-3%); improvement of working conditions (65-3%); and assess- 
ment of the activities of factory and enterprise leadership (65-3%). But 30% or more 
favoured a decisive voice for Solidarity in each of the ten policy areas, including nominat- 
ing candidates to leadership positions in the state administration (31-5%); division of the 
national income (40.7%); and reforms of the functioning of government (40 9%).20 This 
shows the divisions within Solidarity, with a strong minority supporting involvement in 
virtually all spheres of the political and economic system. It also reveals the frustration 
with other institutions in Polish society; there being no other means to express the 
legitimate grievances and opinions of the workers, Solidarity would have to do so. 
That Solidarity remained firmly entrenched in Polish society right up to martial law is 
evident from the Polacy '81 survey, completed just two weeks before the crackdown. Of 
the 14 (non-farm) occupational categories listed in this study, a majority in all but one 
(teachers-47 5%) belonged to Solidarity. The union was most strongly represented in 
that most treasured sector of the socialist workforce-skilled workers. This was especially 
true in heavy industry, where 86 7% of the skilled workers belonged to the union; 74- 1 % 
of such workers in light industry were members. Among skilled workers, even three 
quarters of the party members were also in Solidarity.21 
Through numerous surveys conducted during Solidarity's history, the population ex- 
pressed support for its activities, though this support was strongest in the earlier months. 
For example, fully 91-7% of a national sample supported the agreements signed by the 
workers and the government after the summer 1980 strikes.22 At the end of 1980 over 
89% supported the national activities of Solidarity; even 45 % of party members decisively 
supported the union's activities.23 In the last national survey before martial law, Solidarity 
still had the support of a large majority of the population (and of party members) though 
this support had dropped rather sharply since December 1980 (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF SOLIDARITY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL (% ) 
December 1980 December 1981 
Decisively support 57-9 33-2 
Rather support 31-2 37-7 
Rather not support 3.3 9-2 
Decisively not support 1-2 4-7 
Difficult to say 5-6 15-2 
Source: Polacy '80 and Polacy '81. 
These results tend to belie both the contentions of the authorities that Solidarity was no 
longer supported by most people and the assertions of some Solidarity leaders that 
everyone supported the union. Clearly, support for the union remained very high, but the 
almost unanimous support enjoyed in its early days had begun to slip and a sizeable 
minority of the population (almost 30%) was at least ambivalent about Solidarity's role. 
On specific policy issues, Solidarity also found broad support among the population. 
One of the major issues between the government and the union at the end of 1981 was 
access for Solidarity to television and other forms of mass communication. The Polacy '81 
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results show that fully 88% of the population supported this demand for Solidarity, 
including almost 80% of all party members.24 
The one area where Solidarity was losing support was on the use of strikes. In September 
1980 89% had thought that the strikes of the previous summer were justified. But by the 
end of 1981 less than half of the sample (46 3%) supported strikes 'as a form of protest'. 
While members of Solidarity were more inclined to support strikes than non-members, still 
only 17-5% of them decisively supported strikes as a form of protest.25 
The whole issue of the right to strike had become a critical and divisive one by the end of 
1981: 46*2% of the population favoured an outright ban on strikes, while 49% opposed 
such a ban. Solidarity members were much more strongly opposed to such an idea (over 
60%) than was the general population.26 For Solidarity, the strike had become one of the 
few legal and institutionalized accomplishments of the movement, and it was the union's 
only real bargaining tool. But the strikes and work stoppages were compounding an 
already very difficult economic situation, and many people were becoming fed up with 
such disruptions. 
This declining support for Solidarity's methods did not, however, translate into a belief 
that Solidarity was bringing the country to ruin, as the regime continues to claim. Of those 
who thought there was a threat to the independence of Poland at the end of 1981, only 4% 
thought Solidarity was the source of this threat, compared with 36% who identified the 
USSR, 20-2% 'the socialist states', and 10 8% the government, or 'other internal forces'.27 
The support for Solidarity may usefully be compared with support for other institutions 
in Poland, particularly the party and the government. Table 2 presents part of the results 
from the surveys on confidence in institutions conducted by the official OBOP in May 
1981 and by Solidarity's OBS, among its own members, in October 1981. 
TABLE 2 
TRUST IN POLISH INSTITUTIONS (% EXPRESSING TRUST) 
Institution Population (May) Solidarity Members (October) 
Catholic Church 94 93 
Solidarity 91 95 
Army 89 68 
Government 69 21 
Branch Unions 56 22 
Militia 42 22 
PUWP 32 7 
Source: OBOP, 'Spoteczne zaufanie do instytucji politycznych, spotecznych i administracyjnych', Warsaw, May 
1981; and OBS, 'Cztonkowie zwiyzku o btldach krajowych wtadz zwi4zku', Warsaw, November 1981. 
As is obvious, Solidarity was far more popular than any official institution, particularly 
among members of Solidarity. The party, as noted earlier, fared badly in these surveys, 
finishing last among the fifteen institutions mentioned in the two polls. During 1981 
support for the party declined even further from its already low levels in 1980, as is evident 
by comparing results from the Polacy '80 and Polacy '81 surveys. In 1980 32- 8% of the 
sample favoured 'strengthening the role of the party in the administration of power'; by the 
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end of 1981 only 20- 4% expressed support for that proposition. The opposite question, on 
limiting the role of the party, asked in 1981, was supported by over 60% of those polled, 
including 46% of all party members! 
Two surveys conducted at the end of 1981 directly addressed the question of who was 
responsible for the country's problems; these shed light on the popular mood in Poland on 
the eve of martial law. The Polacy '81 survey asked 'who was responsible for the deepening 
economic and political crisis in our country', phrased similarly to a question from Polacy 
'80 on those responsible for delaying the implementation of the Gdanisk agreements. The 
results appear in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 


















It is apparent that few people viewed Solidarity as the main culprit. But during 1981 
there was also a substantial decline in the number who assigned primary blame to the 
government. Solidarity was increasingly assigned part of the blame. 
These findings are confirmed in a poll on 'social tensions' and 'relations between the 
authorities and Solidarity' conducted by OBOP in September and again on November 
23-24, three weeks before the introduction of martial law (See Table 4).28 
TABLE 4 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLAND'S PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC OPINION (%) 
1. Among those believing a confrontation 
is inevitable, placing the blame on: 
primarily the authorities 
primarily Solidarity 
both sides equally 
2. Among those thinking authority-Solidarity 





3. Concessions are necessary from: 
primarily the government 
primarily Solidarity 
both sides equally 
4. Those expressing trust in: 
The Government 

























Source: OBOP, 'Napiecia spoteczne i stosunki wtadza-Solidarnosc w opinii publicznej', Warsaw, November 
1981. 
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Even in this officially sponsored (though not published) poll, the authorities were much 
more likely to be blamed for Poland's crisis than was Solidarity. At the same time, the 
public increasingly felt that Solidarity was also part of the problem, and that concessions 
and compromise were necessary on both sides. The data for question four in this table are 
particularly striking, marking a startling decline in support for the Solidarity leadership in 
the last months of 1981. Trust in Solidarity's leadership was still somewhat higher than that 
in the government, but these figures (reliable or not) certainly seem likely to have been a 
factor in the regime's decision to move against Solidarity in December. 
The tempered support for Solidarity at the end of 1981 reflected an increasingly 
moderate and conciliatory stance of the members of Solidarity and of the population. The 
Polacy '81 survey showed that the naming of a government of national unity was favoured 
by three quarters of the population, including 88- 3% of Solidarity members. The govern- 
ment subsequently claimed that it was Solidarity that opposed the idea of reconciliation. 
The same survey found just as many people supporting as opposing the idea of a temporary 
suspension of free Saturdays in mining and other important sectors of the economy. The 
issue of free Saturdays was a sensitive one, obviously, since it was one of Solidarity's main 
achievements from the Gdanisk accords. Yet over 46% of the national sample favoured 
this idea. In Solidarity's own poll among workers in these affected areas of the economy, 
71% to 83% of the workers said they would be willing to work on free Saturdays.29 
There was also an increasingly conciliatory stance among the population on the issue of 
strikes. As noted above, by the end of 1981 about half of the population favoured a 
suspension of the right to strike. Even Solidarity members were taking a less combative 
position on this issue. When OBS asked Solidarity members what the reaction of the union 
should be if the right to strike were suspended, 35% opposed any protest action and only 
28% supported the use of a general strike.30 By October 1981 even Lech Walesa was 
increasingly disinclined to use the strike weapon, arguing that in the future strikes should 
be 'active' ones (with work continuing) that would not further disrupt the economy.3' This 
conciliatory and compromising orientation was matched by an increasingly optimistic 
assessment of the possibility of a peaceful resolution of Poland's problems. This is evident 
from the same questions asked by OBOP in September, October and November 1981 (see 
Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
OPINION ON THE LIKELY RESOLUTION OF UNREST (%) 
September 1981 October 1981 November 1981 
By dialogue and agreement 53 65 69 
By a test of strength and the use of force 40 22 19 
Source: OBOP, 'Napiecia spoteczne i stosunki wtadza-Solidarnosc w opinii publicznej', Warsaw, November 
1981. 
The last of these surveys was conducted on November 24, less than three weeks after the 
meeting of the 'Big Three', Walesa, Glemp and Jaruzelski, and the results undoubtedly 
reflected optimism that such talks would be both fruitful and continuing. Apparently, the 
regime felt otherwise. 
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Solidarity and the Regime under Martial Law 
The invocation of martial law may be seen as an attempt to fill the power vacuum in 
Poland with the only institution that was tolerable to both society and the ruling group. The 
party was in no position to supersede Solidarity, having lost most of its credibility and a 
good deal of its membership in the preceding two years. The government was viewed as 
much more culpable than Solidarity for the country's problems. That left the Church, 
Solidarity, and the Army. The Church could not and would not play a more direct political 
role. The ruling group would not allow Solidarity to emerge as a major political force. So 
the Army filled the breach. The Army, as noted above, still continued to enjoy a high 
degree of trust from the population. The Army's 'territorial operational groups', set up 
earlier in the year (ostensibly) to help the economy, were viewed as beneficial to society by 
91% of respondents in one survey.32 Jaruzelski himself, who took the position of chairman 
of the Military Council of National Salvation (WRON), was also a fairly popular figure, 
and was the top vote getter in the Central Committee elections of the previous July. 
Jaruzelski and the Army tried at first to play on the theme that the Army was above 
politics, or at least above the party, and dramatised this by removing the red party flag from 
the 'House of the Party' in Warsaw and replacing it with the red and white Polish flag. 
A month into martial law, OBOP conducted its first survey under the new circum- 
stances, among the residents of Warsaw. The results, reported three weeks later in the 
Warsaw press, showed that 51% of the respondents considered the decision to introduce 
martial law 'justified' and only 19% thought it was unjustified.33 Few people in Warsaw 
believed the results of this poll and most professionals involved in survey research (in 
conversations with this writer) doubted that any polls in the rigid atmosphere of January 
1982 could be considered reliable. But the official press indirectly referred to these results 
in contending that 'the absolute majority' of the Polish nation 'fully supported the decision 
of the Military Council of National Salvation'.34 
This conclusion seems unjustified, given the results of the early December surveys 
discussed above. The population continued to support Solidarity and its policies, though 
there was a demand for greater flexibility on the part of the union's leaders as well as the 
government. Support for strikes had declined sharply over the course of the year, but most 
people did not attribute the economic problems primarily to Solidarity. Thus, it is not 
surprising that many (if not most) Poles considered martial law to have been, at least, an 
over-reaction. 
In the absence of any reliable public opinion data on these issues (only one poll, 
mentioned above, was published in the first seven months of martial law) it is difficult to 
assess the support for Solidarity. But there are fragmentary data. An informal poll 
conducted by Solidarity members in three factories in Warsaw between January 20 and 
March 3, reported in an underground publication, showed almost unanimous support for 
the continued existence of Solidarity under its old statutes, and for the leadership of the 
organization.35 An official survey of attitudes towards trade unions, including Solidarity, 
conducted by OBOP and the Academy of Sciences at the end of March 1982, produced 
results surprising enough to the regime to preclude their publication. Apparently the poll 
showed that over 70% of the population favoured immediate reinstatement of 
Solidarity.36 
541 
SOLIDARITY, THE REGIME 
While Solidarity continues to enjoy popular support, the party has declined further. 
Defections from the party had accelerated in the last half of 1981, and continued after 
December 13 in protest against martial law. Between July 1981 and February 1982 almost 
500,000 members left the party,37 the largest drop in the organization's history. Almost 
50,000 more were crossed off the party lists in March alone.38 After December 13 there 
were also widespread resignations among professional party workers-according to 
Jaruzelski, the largest cadre changes in the party's history.39 This internal disintegration of 
the party further weakened the effectiveness of an organization already discredited in the 
eyes of the public. 
Jaruzelski was clearly banking on the status and popularity of the Army to maintain 
some semblance of support for the martial law regime. Given the high levels of trust in the 
Army demonstrated through public opinion polls, it was likely that there would at least be a 
certain honeymoon period for the Army in the first months of 1982. But the longer the 
Army was at least formally in control, the more it became identified with the less popular 
party and militia, and with the continued suppression of Solidarity. 
This raises again the issue of mass-elite linkages and the need for some kind of mechan- 
ism that would promote dialogue between the authorities and the population. This is 
particularly necessary now, as the economic crisis continues to deepen while the regime 
simultaneously attempts to implement an economic reform programme that will result in 
even more dislocations, at least in the short run. Even the official position is that it will take 
three years to emerge from the crisis, and eight years for the government to make progress 
on repaying Western debts. The reform is decentralizing and relies on increased levels of 
initiative and autonomy at both the factory and the individual level. If the population 
retains its passive and negative stance toward the authorities, the reform cannot work. 
Adding to these problems is a projected freeze on wages and social benefits and, because 
of the abandonment of the principle of planned employment, the expectation that in 1982 
alone some 8000 university graduates and 20,000 secondary school graduates would not 
find jobs.40 These factors are bound to increase social tensions. Given the time frame for 
recovery it is unlikely the Polish population will come along peacefully unless it can be 
voluntarily engaged in the process of recovery and reform. 
The regime was apparently sensitive to this issue in the first months of martial law, and 
moved to set up a whole series of 'consultative' organs attached to the Sejm, the Council of 
Ministers and the voivodship governments. The Consultative Economic Council of the 
Council of Ministers, for example, was envisaged as an 'important instrument of dialogue 
between the authorities and society'.4 But all of these were appointed rather than elected 
and most of them consisted of 'experts' rather than ordinary people. It was unlikely that 
they could fill the vacuum between the government and the population. 
The major issue remained the future role of the trade unions, and particularly of 
Solidarity. In the first half of 1982 some surprisingly conciliatory statements on Solidarity 
issued from official sources. In a May 3 speech to the Sejm, for example, Vice-Premier 
Rakowski recognized Solidarity's contribution to 'the protest against the deviation from 
socialism, aspirations for complete justice, active participation in decision-making on 
public matters, and respect for citizens' rights and dignity'. 'The positive aspirations', he 
said, 'constitute a sacred part of the achievement of People's Poland' and will be carried 
on.42 Jan Szczepaniski, Poland's most eminent sociologist, who became chairman of one of 
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the government's new advisory councils, spoke against the tendency to identify Solidarity 
with 'opposition groups' outside the union. 'Solidarity brought together millions of people 
who were concerned that the slogans of social justice, respect for dignity, and co- 
participation in decision-making on public affairs, the same slogans which were marked on 
the flags of socialism, were really accomplished'.43 The Council of Ministers' draft statutes 
for trade unions published in February 1982 also left some room for compromise. They 
called for 'self-governing trade unions independent from the administration and the state 
employers'. The proposal allowed for the labour movement to have its own press and to 
benefit from the instruments of mass communication. Unions would have had the right to 
strike, though only as a last resort, and not for political reasons. And the unions would use 
these tools 'to call into question opinions by the state bodies'.44 The underground Solidar- 
ity leadership, however, and apparently Walesa as well, insisted on three conditions for the 
new unions: democratic elections of their leaders; a regional structure; and statutes as 
passed by Solidarity's First Congress.45 
As the stalemate continued under martial law, the regime's position became less and less 
flexible. The government required 'good behaviour' from the population as a condition for 
relaxation of martial law regulations. Solidarity's underground leaders, however, felt they 
could expect no concessions from the authorities without continued pressure and demon- 
strations of the union's continuing existence and support. With each of the major Solidar- 
ity demonstrations in May and August of 1982, the regime's response became tougher, 
and conciliatory voices became less evident. With the formal banning of Solidarity in 
October 1982, the chance for compromise seemed to disappear. The new trade unions set 
up by the government attracted relatively few members as Solidarity's underground 
leadership called for a boycott of the organizations. 
Conclusion 
Martial law did bring about a temporary stabilization of the economic situation, espe- 
cially in terms of food supplies. But it did not solve, and indeed exacerbated, the underly- 
ing political problems in Poland. The fundamental problem remains the lack of communi- 
cation between the leadership and the society. As a Polish sociologist pointed out, 'if we do 
not want cyclical outbreaks of social rebellion on a mass scale, there must be conditions for 
the systems of mobilization from above and articulation from below to have relatively 
equal strength'.4 Solidarity provided that kind of balance, but the regime never fully 
accepted the idea of a balance of power in the political system. The problem was com- 
pounded as both sides lacked experience in handling political conflict in a peaceful way. As 
Jacek Maziarski put it in 1981: 
our society is not yet used to living with publicized open conflicts, because until now they were kept 
secret and pushed under the surface. Over the years, we have gotten used to a fictitious vision of 
public life devoid of differing positions and conflicts.47 
During the Solidarity era both sides tended to be rigid and uncompromising, to question 
the motives of the other, and to focus attention on the 'extremists' on the other side rather 
than trying to nurture the moderates. As a result, as the crisis deepened and the lines 
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hardened, the hard-liners became more vocal in both Solidarity and the government. With 
the imposition of martial law, the latter prevailed. 
Contrary to these trends, however, the Polish public was increasingly inclined toward 
negotiation and compromise during 1981. While most people continued to support 
Solidarity, there was increasing dissatisfaction with the union's leadership. It is likely, 
therefore, that eventually the leaders would have come to reflect the more moderate and 
conciliatory views of the members, and of society. In any case, the views of Solidarity 
leaders were much closer to those of the population as a whole than were the government's 
views. On virtually every issue, there was a wide gap between the opinions of high level 
leadership and the population. The regime had become isolated from society, even to the 
extent of retarding the grass-roots reform movement within its own party. 
Given the breadth and depth of support for Solidarity, the belief by most people that 
Solidarity embodied the ideas of socialism better than any other institution in Poland, and 
Poland's history of rebellion, it seems inevitable that there will be new convulsions in that 
country if Solidarity is not allowed to re-emerge. It is probably still true, as Solidarity 
adviser Andrzej Tymowski said in November 1981, that Solidarity and the authorities 
need each other: 
the Party and the government are necessary for Solidarity to protect it in the system of our 
international relations; on the other hand, Solidarity is necessary for the other side ... as a buffer 
protecting it from society.48 
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